Philosophy of Science

Participation Prerequisites

No prerequisites.

Course Content

Syllabus

Unit 1 Economic Models
Week 1: Models as Isolations
Week 2: Models as Surrogate Systems
Week 3: Rationality

Unit 2 Revolutions: Notions
Week 4: Utility I
Week 5: Utility II
Week 6: Well-Being

Unit 3 Revolutions: Disciplines
Week 7: Evolutionary Economics
Week 8: Behavioural Economics
Week 9: Experimental Economics
Week 10: Neuroeconomics

Intended Learning Outcomes and Competencies

Course Aims

This doctoral seminar course examines a series of philosophical issues in contemporary
economic modelling and theorizing. We will discuss key concepts and methods from
philosophy of economics and philosophy of science. We will ask how these concepts and
methods inform current economic research and practice. We will explore concrete case studies
targeting notions such as rationality, utility and well-being. During the course, you will be
trained to: coherently integrate empirical and theoretical insights from multiple disciplines;
articulate persuasive and well-structured arguments for specific positions; adopt a self-directed
and original approach to recent debates at the interface between philosophy of economics and
philosophy of science.

Instruction Type

The course spans 12 sessions. During the first session, the course structure will be outlined andthe seminar topics will be allocated. The final session is devoted to a final revision of the coursecontents. The central 10 sessions are roughly divi ded into three parts. The first part focuses on some central distinctions concerning model construction and model evaluation in economics.
The second part examines alleged instances of revolutionary change in economic theory, devoting particular attention to the notions of utility and well-being. The third part assesses recent advances at the interface between economic, psychology and neuroscience in light of the philosophical literature on scientific revolutions. Each seminar session consists of one presentation (15 minutes) followed by class discussion. Readings are made available via email.Attendance is compulsory. Absences require reasonable excuses.

Form of Examination

One class presentation on a chosen presentation question (not graded) and one short essay
(2000 words, pass/fail) from a chosen presentation question (which can be the same as the
presentation).

Deadlines: short essay to be submitted via e-mail (pdf and word versions) by September, 30.

Literature

Detailed Reading List

Economic Models

Week 1: Models as Isolations
“Isolation plays a central role in economic modelling”. Discuss.
Required
Mäki, U. 1992. On the method of isolation in economics. Poznan´ Studies in the Philosophy of
Science and the Humanities, 26, 316–351.
Background
Cartwright, N. 2009. If No Capacities Then No Credible Worlds. But Can Models Reveal Capacities?
Erkenntnis, 70, 45–58.
Giere, R. 2004. How models are used to represent reality. Philosophy of Science, 71, 742–752.
Godfrey-Smith, P. 2006. The strategy of model-based science. Biology and Philosophy, 21, 725–740.
Teller, P. 2001. Twilight of the Perfect Model Model. Erkenntnis, 55, 393-415.
Weisberg, M. 2007. Three Kinds of Idealization. The Journal of Philosophy, 104, 639-659.

Week 2: Models as Surrogate Systems
How does Sugden’s account differ from the one proposed by Maki?
Required
Sugden, R. 2009. Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms. Erkenntnis, 70, 3-27.
Mäki, U. 2009. MISSing the world. Models as isolations and credible surrogate systems.
Erkenntnis, 70, 29-43.
Background
Fumagalli, R. 2016. Why we cannot Learn from Minimal Models. Erkenntnis, 81, 433-455.
Kuorikoski, J. and Lehtinen, A. 2009. Incredible Worlds, Credible Results. Erkenntnis, 70, 119-31.
Morgan, M. 2001. Models, stories and the economic world. Journal of Economic Methodology, 8, 361–
397.
Sugden, R. 2000. Credible worlds: The status of theoretical models in economics. Journal of Economic
Methodology, 7, 1-31.
Ylikoski, P. and Aydinonat, E. 2014. Understanding with theoretical models. Journal of Economic
Methodology, 21, 19-36.

Week 3: Rationality
Do observed violations of completeness and transitivity imply that rational choice theory is
descriptively and normatively baseless? Why?
Required
Sugden, R. 1991. Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy.
The Economic Journal, 101, 751-785.
Background
Elster, J. The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation. In Readings in the Philosophy of the
Social Science, M. Martin and L. McIntyre, Ch.20.
Kacelnik, A. 2006. Meanings of rationality. In S. Hurley and M. Nudds (ed.) Rational Animals? Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 87–106.
Lukes, S. Some Problems about Rationality. In Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Science, M.
Martin and L. McIntyre, Ch.18.
Sen, A. 1977. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory.
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, 317–344.
Starmer, C. 2000. Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory
of Choice under Risk. Journal of Economic Literature, 332-382.

Revolutions: Notions

Week 4: Utility I
Should economics by given psychological foundations? Why?
Required
Bruni, L. and Sugden, R. 2007. The road not taken: how psychology was removed from
economics and how it might be brought back. The Economic Journal, 117, 146-173.
Background
Bruni, L. and Guala, F. 2001. Pareto and the epistemological foundations of rational choice. History of
Political Economy, 33, 21-49.
Dietrich, F. and List, C. 2016. Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics. Economics and
Philosophy, 32, 249-281.
Fumagalli, R. 2016. Economics, Psychology and the Unity of the Decision Sciences. Philosophy of the
Social Sciences, 46, 103-128.
Samuelson, P. 1938. A note on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour. Economica, 5, 61-67.
Simon, H. 1955. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, 99-118.

Week 5: Utility II
Can we measure utility at the neuro-psychological level?
Required
Kahneman, D., Wakker, P. and Sarin, R. 1997. Back to Bentham? Explorations of experienced
utility. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 375-406.
Background
Colander, D. 2007. Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 21, 215-225.
Fumagalli, R. 2013. The Futile Search for True Utility. Economics and Philosophy, 29, 325-347.
Glimcher, P., Dorris, M. and Bayer, H. 2005. Physiological utility theory and the neuroeconomics of
choice. Games and Economic Behavior, 52, 213-256.
Kahneman, D. and Sugden, R. 2005. Experienced utility as a standard of policy evaluation.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 32, 161-181.
Padoa-Schioppa, C. 2011. Neurobiology of economic choice. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 34, 333-
359.

Week 6: Well-Being
Are subjective measures of well-being accurate and reliable?
Required
Alexandrova, A. 2005. Subjective Well-being and Kahneman’s Objective Happiness. Journal
of Happiness Studies, 6, 301-324.
Hausman, D. and McPherson, M. 2009. Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics.
Economics and Philosophy, 25, 1-25.
Background
Alexandrova, A. 2018. Can the science of well-being be objective? British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 69, 421-445.
Angner, E. 2011. Are Subjective Measures of Well-Being 'Direct'? Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
89, 115-130.
Fumagalli, R. 2021. Theories of Well-Being and Well-Being Policy: A View from Methodology.
Journal of Economic Methodology, 28, 124-133.
Hersch, G. 2015. Can an evidential account justify relying on preferences for well-being policy? Journal
of Economic Methodology, 22, 280-291.
Kahneman, D. and Krueger, A. 2006. Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being.
Journal of Economic Perspective, 20, 3-24.

Revolutions: Disciplines

Week 7: Evolutionary Economics
Does evolutionary theory provide informative insights concerning rational choice theory?
Required
Schulz, A. 2012. Beyond the Hype: The Value of Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 20, 1-27.
Background
Bicchieri, C., Duffy, J. and Tolle, G. 2004. Trust Among Strangers. Philosophy of Science, 71, 286-319.
Cooper, W. 1989. How Evolutionary Biology Challenges the Classical Theory of Rational Choice.
Biology and Philosophy, 4, 457-81.
Frank, R., Gilovich, T. and Regan, D. 1993. Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation? Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 7, 159-171.
Rosenberg, A. 1992. Neo-classical Economics and Evolutionary Theory: Strange Bedfellows?
Philosophy of Science, 1, 174-183.
Vromen, J. 2007. Neuroeconomics as a Natural Extension of Bioeconomics: The Shifting Scope of
Standard Economic Theory. Journal of Bioeconomics, 9, 145–167.

Week 8: Behavioural Economics
Do psychological findings bear on the validity of economic models of choice?
Required
Camerer, C. and Loewenstein, G. 2004. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. In
Advances in Behavioral Economics. New York: Princeton University Press, 3-51.
Background
Bernheim, D. and Rangel, A. 2009. Beyond revealed preference. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124,
51-104.
Fumagalli, R. 2011. On the Neural Enrichment of Economic Models: Tractability, Trade-offs and
Multiple Levels of Descriptions. Biology and Philosophy, 26, 617-635.
Kahneman, D. 2003. A psychological perspective on economics. American Economic Review, 93, 162-8.
Rabin, M. 1998. Psychology and Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 11-46.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1986. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. The Journal of
Business, 59, 251-278.

Week 9: Experimental Economics
Do economists need experiments? Why?
Required
Smith, V. 1994. Economics in the laboratory, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 113-131.
Binmore, K. 1999. Why experiment in economics? Economic Journal, 109, F16-F24.
Background
Bechtel, W. 2002. Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive Neuroscience: Why is it
important? Philosophy of Science, 69, S48–S58.
Fumagalli, R. 2014. Neural Findings and Economic Models: Why Brains have Limited Relevance for
Economics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 44, 606-629.
Guala, F. 2012. Experimentation in Economics. In Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol.13,
Mäki, U. Ed. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 597-640.
Mäki, U. 2005. Models are experiments, experiments are models. Journal of Economic Methodology,
12, 303-315.
Mayo, D. 2008. Some Methodological Issues in Experimental Economics, Philosophy of Science, 75,
633-645.

Week 10: Neuroeconomics
How can neuroscience inform economics?
Required
Bernheim, D. 2009. On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1, 1-41.
Background
Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., Prelec, D. 2005. Neuroeconomics: how neuroscience can inform
Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 9-64.
Fumagalli, R. 2016. Five Theses on Neuroeconomics. Journal of Economic Methodology, 23, 77-96.
Glimcher, P. 2009. Choice. In Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain, 503-521. Elsevier.
Gul, F. and Pesendorfer, W. 2008. The case for mindless economics. In Caplin, A. and Schotter, A. Eds.
The foundations of positive and normative economics, 1-40.
Ross, D. 2008. Two styles of neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy, 24, 473-483.